Distributive politics and regional development: assessing the territorial distribution of Turkey’s public investment by Luca, Davide & Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés
  
Davide Luca and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose 
Distributive politics and regional 
development: assessing the territorial 
distribution of Turkey’s public investment 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Luca, Davide and Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés (2015) Distributive politics and regional development: 
assessing the territorial distribution of Turkey’s public investment. Journal of Development 
Studies. ISSN 0022-0388  
 
DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2015.1028536 
 
© 2015 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/63203/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
Electoral politics and regional development: assessing the 
geographical allocation of public investment in Turkey 
 
 
Davide Luca
* 
and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose
*
 
 
 
 
 
* 
Dept. of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science. 
E-mails: d.luca@lse.ac.uk; a.rodriguez-pose@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors thank Riccardo Crescenzi and Waltraud Schelke for 
comments on an earlier draft. Davide Luca acknowledges a Fellowship from the National 
Scientific Research Council of Turkey (TÜBİTAK – BİDEB) while conducting the research. 
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose is grateful for the financial support of the European Research Council 
under the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant 
agreement no 269868. 
 - 2 - 
Electoral politics and regional development: assessing the geographical 
allocation of public investment in Turkey 
 
Abstract 
One of the most important decisions that governments face is how to allocate the public 
resources necessary for development, given each country’s budget constraints. According to 
the literature on the links between wealth and institutional performance, highly kleptocratic 
countries are expected to show higher levels of politicisation of the public purse. The article 
tests the extent to which socioeconomic criteria (equity and efficiency) or electoral concerns 
determined the geographical distribution of public investment in the 81 provinces of Turkey 
between 2004 and 2012. Our results show that, although electoral concerns mattered for the 
allocation, socioeconomic measures remained the most relevant predictors of investment. 
Moreover, in contrast to official regional development policy principles, the Turkish state 
tended to favour areas with a higher level of development over those with greater 
‘socioeconomic need’. Our results therefore challenge much of the distributive politics 
literature, which has overly emphasised the role of pork-barrel in public policy-making. At 
the same time, they underline the need of paying more attention to the political economy of 
regional development strategies.  
Keywords: Regional development policies; distributive politics; public investments; political 
geography; Turkey.  
JEL Classification: H76; O12; O53; R12; R58 
 - 3 - 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important decisions that governments face, both in rich and in 
emerging countries, is how to geographically allocate the public resources necessary for 
development, given each country’s budget constraints. In contrast to conventional regional 
development approaches, which have seen public interventions as purely driven by technical 
socioeconomic considerations, a body of theoretical contributions and empirical studies at the 
interface between economics and political science has explored in the last two decades how 
the spatial distribution of public resources and government programmes is driven not only by 
efficiency and equity, but also by electoral concerns. Advances in data availability in the last 
decades have allowed the extension of this line of research to a large number of countries 
(Golden and Min, 2013). Such a steep increase in the interest about how politics affects the 
territorial allocation of public funds is generally referred to as distributive politics (Persson 
and Tabellini, 2000; Golden and Min, 2013). Results frequently suggest that public 
investments, as well as other policy tools aimed at regional development, such as 
geographically targeted grants and investment incentives, have had a whiff of pork-barrel 
around them (Milligan and Smart, 2005). According to the literature on the links between 
wealth and institutional performance, highly kleptocratic countries are expected to show 
higher levels of politicisation of the public purse.   
While much of economic and regional development literature has tended to overlook issues 
related to electoral politics and its influence on policy-making, the majority of the political 
economy literature has precisely put how electoral politics shapes the distribution of public 
investments at its heart.  
This article complements both the literature on regional development policy – which has 
largely overlooked the impact of electoral politics behind decisions about the allocation of 
government goods and services –, as well as the distributive politics literature – which has 
over-emphasised the marring of public policy by electoral interests. It will do so by analysing 
the extent to which electoral factors prevail over technical considerations in the allocation of 
public investments in a country traditionally considered as highly kleptocratic – and, 
therefore, more likely to be prone to political manipulations.  
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We test our hypothesis in Turkey, a country which as early as 1963 established an ad-hoc 
institution and a specific policy agenda aimed at curbing the high regional disparities which, 
however, still persist. In spite of a few earlier related pieces of work analysing the distribution 
of grants to municipalities for 1997 (Tekeli and Kaplan, 2008) and of investment incentives 
for the period 2001-2008 (Yavan, 2012), this study will be the first to explore the allocation of 
public investments executed by the central government in Turkey following the electoral 
victory of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Empirically, the goals of this 
paper are: 
1) To measure the extent to which the spatial allocation of central fixed capital 
investments in Turkey reflects socioeconomic criteria and regional developmental ‘need’ 
(policy responsiveness); 
2) To assess the extent to which politics may be a factor in generating a disconnect 
between allocations and ‘need’ (electoral distributive politics). The fact that investments 
should be guided, according to Development Plans’ official rationales, by economic 
principles allows us to determine a general allocative baseline from which to measure the 
extent of political distortions; 
Our estimation strategy is based on the adoption of both fixed-effects and generalized 
method of moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) in a 
dataset for Turkey’s 81 provinces over 2004-2012.  
Turkey has traditionally been regarded in scholarly literature as a kleptocratic country 
where ‘politics has not revolved essentially around the pros and cons of socio-economic 
policies [… but has been deeply] motivated by a desire to garner votes’ (Heper and Keyman, 
2006, p. 259). Yet, our results, which are robust against possible endogeneity, suggest a 
diverging picture. They show that, although electoral concerns do matter for the allocation of 
development funds, socioeconomic measures remain very strong predictors of public 
investment. Moreover, in contrast to official regional development policy principles, the 
Turkish state seems to favour areas with a higher level of development over those with the 
most critical ‘socioeconomic need’.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: section two provides an overview of the literature on 
the political economy of regional development policies and sets the research hypotheses. 
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Section three introduces Turkey’s institutional background. Section four discusses the data, 
the empirical variables, and the estimation strategy. Section five explores the results. Section 
six draws the discussion to a conclusion. 
 
2. Electoral politics and the territorial distribution of public investments  
2.1. The political economy of regional development policies 
The design of policies aimed at regional development has traditionally tended to focus on 
the trade-off between equity and efficiency. How a more effective economic policy to tackle 
regional inequalities should be designed remains hotly discussed (e.g.: Barca, 2009; OECD, 
2009; World Bank, 2009). The debate has, however, not paid adequate attention to the impact 
of electoral politics on the design of public policy. A growing body of research linking 
economics and political science has explored how in the real world public grants and 
investment programmes are also distributed on the basis of ‘purely political’ considerations 
(Persson, 1998). A number of studies in political economy demonstrate that, in parallel to 
grand/programmatic redistribution, a second type of redistribution is constantly taking place. 
This form of ‘politically-driven’ tactical redistribution (Dixit and Londregan, 1996) is likely 
to be carried on even when the same general development policy framework remains 
constant. Under this perspective, equity and efficiency – the two key drivers which, 
independently from the existence or not of a trade-off between reducing regional disparities 
and stimulating the overall national growth, motivate the first form of redistribution – are 
germane only if understood as tools for increasing the probability of re-election of those in 
public office. Following earlier research (Dewar, 1998; Crescenzi, 2009), we therefore posit 
that the understanding of regional development policies should emerge from the analysis of 
both the economics and the political economy of such programmes. 
According to the public choice literature, the reason behind the influence of politics on 
policy-making is that, even within democratic institutions, politicians may act as self-
interested actors. They are instrumental in their behaviour (Dunleavy, 1991) and are likely to 
deliver more to those voters who can keep them in power. Electoral politics made thus topple 
economics when it comes to the territorial distribution of public funds.   
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Such a ‘political market bias’ may be defined as even more relevant in developing 
economies (Richardson and Townroe, 1986) and  in all contexts where the legitimacy of the 
state, as well as a strong civil society and formal institutions, are not fully developed. In such 
environments, there is greater room for stronger informal consensus building practices 
(Özcan, 2000, 2006). It is commonly accepted that wealth is negatively associated with 
corruption and institutional performances. It can therefore be expected that corrupt 
distributive politics and patronage will be more pervasive in emerging countries rather than in 
rich economies. In the case of Turkey, for example, it has been long stressed that a high level 
of politicisation of the public purse has been used as a tool to retain power (Danielson and 
Keleṣ, 1985; Heper and Keyman, 2006).  
2.2. Exploring models of distributive politics and their pitfalls  
Within the literature on the links between politico-electoral systems and the geographical 
targeting of public resources, a ‘classic’ debate has flourished on whether distributive politics 
is carried out to cement or to buy votes. According to the first explanation, the districts most 
likely to be favoured in the distribution of public resources will be the strongholds of the 
central governing party – at the expense of those supporting opposition parties – because risk-
averse politicians will prefer strengthening their core electorates’ loyalties rather than 
embarking in politically-risky electoral investments (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). By contrast, 
other scholars foresee models where utility-maximising politicians will first favour groups – 
or districts (Golden and Min, 2013) – with the highest electoral productivity, i.e. those most 
willing to switch their votes following economic favours (Dixit and Londregan (1996). 
Recently, Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2012) have argued that in the emerging and developing world 
core voters models are more likely to be appropriate. Their reasoning is motivated by 
acknowledging how party loyalty is not something given, but endogenous to the distributive 
politics dynamics. Emerging country politicians will be more prone to invest in core voters 
because voters’ loyalty at the ballot box is assumed to be conditional and strongly determined 
upon material inducement. From this perspective, voters become loyal to the party not only 
because of the benefits received today, but also because of those they expect to receive in the 
future. Hence, although partisanship can still be based on a moral sense of obligation as 
foreseen in earlier literature, in such approach party loyalties are basically conditional (Díaz-
Cayeros et al., 2012).  
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The specific geographical targeting of public resources as a means of political tactics 
and/or as an answer to pressures by special interest groups has been reported by an increasing 
number of studies. Overall, the literature on distributive politics has amassed a record of 
evidence and systematic data showing how the political actors use their control over public 
goods to reinforce their electoral advantage. Such literature has explored factors ranging from 
regional grants and federal spending (Alperovich, 1984; Grossman, 1994; Case, 2001; Tekeli 
and Kaplan, 2008; Larcinese et al., 2012;), trade and industrial policy (McGillivray, 2004), 
infrastructure investments (Crain and Oakley, 1995;  Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005; Milligan 
and Smart, 2005; Cadot et al., 2006; Golden and Picci, 2008; Kemmerling and Stephan, 
2008), investment incentives schemes (Yavan, 2012), to EU cohesion policy ( Kemmerling 
and Bodestein, 2006; Crescenzi, 2009; Bouvet and Dall’erba, 2010). Much of this political 
economy literature has overemphasised the impact of politics on policy-making. As Golden 
and Min (2013, p. 14) argue: “indeed, it is perhaps surprising that any politician ever loses 
elected office given the impressive evidence that has been amassed showing the politicization 
of the public purse”. 
2.3. Research question and hypotheses 
Drawing from the above discussed literature and, specifically, on Golden and Picci (2008), 
this article puts forward a model of resource allocation to assess the extent to which the 
allocation of public investments aimed at the economic development of Turkish provinces 
depends on economic or electoral politics criteria. The model includes socioeconomic 
disadvantage and electoral politics as key allocation criteria. We model public investment as 
driven by: 
I = f (Socioeconomic factors, electoral politics)                                                                                  (1) 
We assume that the Turkish government may be driven by either conventional 
socioeconomic considerations, or by ‘tactical political redistribution’ considerations, in the 
territorial allocation of public funding. We model two opposing hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: according to redistribution and equity criteria, the central government should 
first target capital investments to regions where disadvantage is higher, i.e. where 
developmental needs are most urgent.  
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Standard approaches to regional development policies have been concentrated on income 
differentials, defending such choice by arguing that wealth measures such as GDP per-capita 
are a good, comprehensive indicator of poverty and deprivation. However, there seems to be a 
marked, increasing concern about the distance between standard economic measures such as 
GPD and broader measures of societal well-being (Stiglitz et al., 2010). Wealth variables, in 
fact, measure the absence of resources at a particular moment without neither questioning the 
reasons behind poverty, nor the possible ways to get away from it. In line with such views, 
numerous contributions have proposed an approach more attentive to socio-structural 
conditions (Perrons, 2011) and the idea that regional development policies should tackle not 
only the levels of disparities expressed in GPD per-capita – i.e. the contextual indicators of 
disadvantage – but also the structural socioeconomic long-term causes which prevent 
individuals from overcoming such inequalities. Our focus will be precisely on the overall 
level of socioeconomic development, as well as on drivers of structural disadvantage such as 
growth-retarding socio-demographic characteristics (Rodríguez-Pose, 1999), namely: labour 
force structure, educational attainment, and health conditions. 
Alternatively, and in line with the policy recommendations of the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2009 (World Bank, 2009), emerging countries governments may, under 
the constraint of scarce resources, prefer to aim for national efficiency by targeting core 
regions and large agglomerations first since growth and spatial distribution goals are often 
difficult to reconcile. This was the strategy officially pursued by the Turkish state during the 
first decades of the Republic (see next paragraphs). According to some scholars, however, the 
start of regional development interventions did not alter substantially such logic (Danielson 
and Keleṣ, 1985; Gezici and Hewings, 2004). The first alternative hypothesis therefore states  
Hypothesis 1.A: investments are allocated according to socioeconomic factors. The sign of 
the relationship, however, may be opposite to that expected from hypothesis 1, i.e. higher 
levels of development being positively, rather than negatively, correlated to investments. 
The second sub-research hypothesis, by contrast, is aimed at assessing the impact of 
politics on the territorial distribution 
Hypothesis 2: Electoral politics considerations prevail over socioeconomic criteria in the 
allocation of investments.  
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Such hypothesis follows the distributive politics literature, which has extensively shown 
how politicians use the distribution of public monies to increase their re-election probabilities. 
 
3. Turkey and its institutional background 
Turkey offers an interesting case for analysing the link between electoral politics and 
public expenditure for different reasons. First, it was an early mover among developing 
countries in being concerned and addressing territorial disparities. As early as 1963, the 
country established an ad-hoc institution and a specific policy agenda aimed at curbing the 
high regional inequality which, however, still persists. In spite of such a long history of 
regional development policies, interventions have recorded a limited effectiveness – a fact 
strongly stressed by the European Commission since the start of Turkey’s EU-accession 
negotiations (Luca, 2011) and also acknowledged by the State bureaucracy (Devlet Planma 
Teskilati, 2003b).  
Second, the strong dependence of the allocation of investment on central government 
allows identifying programmatic and tactical redistribution trends more easily than in 
countries where multiple institutional levels are important political arena and play a role in the 
spatial distribution of resources. The fact that investments are spent by local branches of the 
central state also reduces the risk of omitted variable bias related to the different absorption 
capacity of regions in more decentralised systems. One of the biggest concerns of the 
literature on distributive politics is the possible endogeneity of electoral results to the 
distribution of government goods (Larcinese et al., 2012, p. 3). The neat political change 
occurred in Turkish politics in 2002 with the election of Erdogan’s newly formed AKP, offers 
an exogenous shock which helps minimise endogeneity in the identification strategy.  
Third, as Posner and Kramon (2011) empirically show, governments are likely to favour 
constituencies via targeting multiple goods at the same time. If such allocations are done to 
accommodate more than just one interest group, i.e. if distributive patterns are not constant 
across types of goods, the results will likely become dependent on which good – among the 
range of pork types used by the government – researchers are focusing on. Preliminary 
research has already been conducted on the distribution of public incentives to foster private 
investments – one of the two main regional development policy tools adopted by the Turkish 
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government – by Yavan (2012). To our best knowledge no research has yet concentrated on 
public fixed capital investments – the other key tool. 
Last but not least, following Yeung (2001)’s call for social scientists to pay more attention 
to ‘neglected regions’ of the world, our analysis allows shedding more light on the political 
economy of a country whose coverage in the international literature is rather low, in spite of 
its increasing role as a key Mediterranean and Eurasian power, as well as its status of EU-
candidate country. Investigating the causes that limit Turkey’s success in reducing regional 
economic disparities is also relevant in the context of EU accession negotiations. Considering 
the size of the country and its extremely high territorial disparities between its Western and 
Eastern regions, if ever accepted into the European Union, the country may become the 
biggest recipient of Structural Funds. 
3.1. Regional development policies in Turkey 
The specific balance between territorial equity and overall national efficiency that 
governments consider when implementing territorially-redistributive regional development 
policies differ from country to country, depending on societal values and on constitutional 
provisions (Solé-Ollé, 2010). During the four first republican decades of the Turkish State 
(1923-1962), the official priority was the concentration of investments in major urban areas 
with the aim of fostering the overall national growth (Eraydin, 2000). The shift in attention to 
regional inequalities happened however relatively early. In 1963 the country set up an ad-hoc 
institution in charge of multi-annual planning – the State Planning Organisation (Devlet 
Planma Teșkilatı, DPT), recently transformed into the Ministry of Development – with a 
specific agenda aimed at reducing regional disparities. Article 166 of the 1982 Constitution 
explicitly calls for public policies to tackle regional imbalances via a “speedy, balanced, and 
harmonious development of industry and agriculture throughout the country”. The starting of 
the planning era was induced by the National Unity Committee following the 1960 military 
coup. As Ozbudun and Ulusan (1980) stress, the military rulers were rather sympathetic to the 
concept of planning and the idea of an organism aimed not merely at the physical growth of 
the nation, but also at a peaceful transformation of the existing systems. Since then, the 
Ministry of Development (former DPT) has been in charge of preparing multiannual 
development plans highlighting the priorities and strategies of all Ministries and other public 
agencies. The plans – whose length was recently extended from 5 to 7 years – are then 
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implemented through annual programmes detailing out the budgetary allocation of public 
investments. While the plans are prepared by a supposedly independent, technical 
bureaucracy, their final approval is the prerogative of decision-makers.  
Since the 1980s and particularly during the last decade, Turkey has also taken progressive 
steps towards an incipient decentralisation (Dulupcu, 2005; Özcan and Turunç, 2008). 
However, the country still remains one of the most centralised public finance systems among 
OECD countries (Blöchliger and Rabesona, 2009).  
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Figure 1. Shares of public gross fixed investments on total gross fixed investments and on 
gross national product, 1950-2010.  
 
Source: own elaboration on data from the Ministry of Development’s database 
Figure 1 shows the share of public gross fixed capital investments in the Turkish economy. 
Despite a recent reduction, public investment still accounts for around 5 % of the total GNP. 
This is higher than other OECD countries such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, or the United 
Kingdom (Gönenç et al., 2005).  
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average amount of fixed-capital public investments 
during the period of analysis. The average mean across 2004-2012, expressed in logarithmic 
terms, is 5.19 Turkish Lira per capita, with a standard deviation across provinces of 0.41.  
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Figure 2. Geographical distribution of average fixed-capital public investments during 2004-
2012. 
Source: own elaboration on data from the Ministry of Development’s database 
3.2. The evolution of regional disparities 
Despite the spread of wealth to some new regions during the last decades, particularly to 
areas neighbouring the traditional cores, Turkey continues to have a highly unequal spatial 
distribution of economic activities and, most importantly, of many social developmental 
indicators.
1
 In 2003, for example, the GDP per capita in the richest NUTS II region (TR10, 
Istanbul) was 1.43 times the national average while in the poorest region (TRB2, Bitlis, 
Hakkari, Muș, Van) it represented only 0.35 times the national medium value (Turkstat, 
2006). Moreover, the majority of recent studies – all analysing the period up to the early 
2000s –  do not find evidence of inter-regional convergence (Karaman and Dogruel, 2011), 
neither in terms of per-capita GPD (Gezici and Hewings 2004, 2007), nor new firms creation 
                                                 
1
 In 2010, the country’s Human Development Index was ranked 83rd in the world, behind any other EU, 
Eastern European and Balkan country. In the same year Turkey’s Gender Gap Index ranked 126th, well behind 
several Asian, African and Arab states (Bardak and Majcher-Teleon, 2011). All these low rankings closely 
reflect the spatially uneven human and economic development in the country, with all the five poorest NUTS II 
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(Gaygısız and Koksal, 2003), or unemployment rates (Filiztekin, 2009). Gezici and Hewings 
(2007)’s results, in particular, indicate how a contrasting trend of reduction in intra-regional 
disparities has been accompanied by an increase in inter-regional ones.  
Figure 3. Change in regional disparities: population-weighted coefficient of variation of 
NUTS 2 regions’ per-capita Gross Value Added.  
 
Source: own elaboration on data from OECD’s regional database 
Figure 3 shows the population-weighted coefficient of variation for regional gross value 
added for recent years. It confirms the lack of clear reductions in inter-regional disparities 
among provinces.  
Figure 4. Scatter plot of per capita fixed-capital investments (Ln) and per capita GVA (Ln) 
between 2004 and 2012. 
                                                                                                                                                        
regions located in the East and the South-East of the country, i.e. the area with the highest concentration of 
ethnic Kurdish people. 
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Source: own elaboration 
Figure 4 shows the correlation between per capita fixed-capital investments annually 
allocated to each province between 2004 and 2012 and the levels of provincial per capital 
GVA (yearly values are pooled). While a correlation between economic outputs and the 
amount of investments allocated is visible, there is considerable variation above and below 
the fitted line. The empirical analysis will uncover which factors explain such variation. 
Figure 4 suggests that the allocation patterns of public investment may be more complex than 
those behind a simple regional redistributive framework. 
3.3. Turkey’s institutional background 
Despite a history of more than 16 multiparty elections and parliamentary rules, Turkey has 
had a difficult time being accepted as a democratic regime by international political and 
academic circles (Sayari and Esmer, 2002). Frequent military coups, internal armed conflicts 
and human rights abuses have traditionally tarnished its reputation. Nonetheless, Turkey has 
enjoyed relative political stability and democratic elections since 1983. In its current form, the 
Turkish Republic is a closed-list proportional-representation electoral system democracy, with 
the d’Hondt formula and a national threshold of 10% used to translate votes into parliament 
seats. As such, electors vote only for a political party, with the party itself controlling over 
which candidates are seated in parliament. Electoral districts coincide with provinces. In the 
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2011 national elections the number of MPs elected from each province ranged between 1 
(Bayburt) and 85 (Istanbul), with a mean value of 6,8.  
In the 1980s and 1990s the Turkish political landscape was characterised by political 
fragmentation (Massicard, 2007), increased electoral volatility (Hazama, 2003) and a party 
system ‘in a state of flux’ (Sayari, 2002, p. 17).  Such weakness of parties along with the 
personalization of politics where pronounced in the eastern and south-eastern provinces 
(Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002). The 2000s brought about neater and more stable political 
panorama. The 2002 elections can be considered a real watershed in Turkish politics 
(Zeyneloglu, 2006; Işık and Pınarcıoğlu, 2010), marked by the rapid rise of a newly formed 
party (AKP),  which has remained in power since.  
Similarly to contemporaneous changes in many other countries, the last two decades also 
witnessed a decrease in the Turkish political polarisation based on left/right ideologies. Many 
analysts suggest an increase in the cleavages built around two main social dimensions: 
religiosity versus laicism and Turkish versus ethnic Kurdish nationalisms (Onis, 1997; Gunes-
Ayata and Ayata, 2002; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, 2006).2 The first social fault line is likely to be 
captured by the contraposition between the pro-Islamic ruling party and the main, laic 
opposition one; the second, instead, will need to be controlled for in the empirical analysis.  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Empirical model and variables 
In order to test our hypotheses, the overall per capita commitments to each province are 
regressed on their potential socioeconomic and political determinants. As pointed out by 
Golden and Picci (2008), public works monies – fixed capital investments in the specific case 
– are classic instances of geographically targetable and divisible goods. At the same time, and 
in line with our main focus, they also constitute an important tool used to support regional 
                                                 
2
 Kurds make up Turkey’s most populous minority. Depending on different estimates, they constitute 
between 12 and 20 % of the population (Mutlu, 1996; Gunes-Ayata and Ayata, 2002). Exact counts are not 
available since 1965. 
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development. This work will focus on Turkish provinces (NUTS III level), because this is a) 
the specific level coinciding with central electoral districts; b) the sub-national level at which 
investments allocations are recorded; and c) the most meaningful administrative partition 
between local municipalities and the central State. 
The empirical model adopts the following form: 
Yi,t = β1Xi,t-1 + β2Pi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                                                      (2) 
Where (i and t denote provinces and years respectively); Yi,t is the total amount of per 
capita national fixed-capital investments allocated to each province; Xi,t-1 and Pi,t-1 represent 
vectors of socioeconomic factors and politics respectively, as described in equation (1);
3
 αi 
and nt are respectively province and year fixed-effects, and ɛi,t is the error term. 
The dependent and the explanatory variables, summarised in Appendix 1, are described in 
the following paragraphs.  
Dependent variable 
Per capita fixed public investments: total values to each province include investments in 
agriculture, manufacturing, transport, housing, education, health and other public services. 
Investments in mining and energy are not included on the basis that they are more likely to be 
allocated according to first nature geographical characteristics and to national priorities 
respectively. A more detailed analysis adopting each single sectorial axis – instead of the total 
investments – as dependent variable cannot be performed because of the limitations of the 
data available.
4
 In doing so we follow earlier research (Deliktaṣ et al. 2008; Karadağ et al., 
                                                 
3
 Investments projects are very likely to stretch over many years so allocations, as well, may be correlated 
over time. While this fact may support the inclusion of the dependent variable’s lagged value Yi,t-1 among the 
regressors, we reject such choice because of the bias that affects FE estimators of dynamic models in the order of 
1/T, i.e. a level too high for our short time span. Tests available on request confirm that the inclusion of lagged 
investments into regressions do not alter the results.  
4
 A large proportion of investments is registered as multi-provincial, so it is not possible to match it with any 
specific province. Over 2004-2012, multi-provincial projects accounted on average for 45.67% of the total public 
investment portfolio, with an annual standard deviation from the period’s overall mean of 5.10. Our analysis will 
only concentrate on the investments which can be matched with single provinces. 
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2004; Celebioğlu and Dall’erba, 2010). All the values are expressed in 1000 Turkish Lira 
(TL) at 2012 prices and in logarithmic terms in order to control for non-linear relations. 
Socioeconomic independent variables 
Due to changes in early 2000s in data collection by Turkstat, provincial data on GDP for 
the whole period of analysis does not exist.
5
 We then try to control for the contextual 
socioeconomic disadvantage via two alternative variables.  
Contextual development level: the first variable is the Provincial Development Index (PDI), 
a composite indicator developed by the Ministry of Development through principal 
component analysis. It takes into account economic (statistics on manufacturing, 
constructions, agriculture, value added, investments and finance) and, to a lesser extent, social 
factors (demographic structure, employment, education, health and various developmental 
parameters). While we are aware that the index may not fully be a proxy for contextual 
wealth, there is no viable alternative to control for contextual development levels.   
Wealth: to check for the robustness of our results, we also include the total number of 
private cars per 10.000 heads. In recent years Turkey experienced a dramatic increase in the 
number of private cars, which are traditionally considered not only as a means of transport, 
but also as sign of economic success.  
In addition, we include four other variables to control for specific socioeconomic structural 
conditions. 
Manufacturing employment: we concentrate on the % of employment in manufacturing on 
total employment because of the central role that industrialisation has played in Turkey’s 
developing economy.  
Health conditions: total number of private and public hospital beds per 10.000 inhabitants. 
Education attainments: % of students in higher education (vocational training and 
university) on total population, as a proxy for the level of education in each province.  
                                                 
5
 Provincial data on GDP is not available after 2001. Turkstat started to collect data on wealth – Gross Value 
Added – again after 2004 (with data being available up to 2011), this time, however, at NUTS II instead of 
NUTS III level. 
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Rural population: in a country such as Turkey characterised by late development and a 
rapid, recent urbanisation, the regional developmental inequalities are likely to be correlated 
with the urban/rural divide, which we proxy by the % of population living in rural areas. 
Political variables 
Party vote shares: party percentage vote shares at national elections are the first, most 
immediate variables able to capture the political clout of provinces. By including both the 
incumbent party as well as the main opposition ones, we can also test whether funding 
allocations following political criteria mainly reward constituencies aligned with the 
incumbent governments or punish those voting for the opposition. We exclusively focus on 
the central political level as the main regional development decisions are still strongly in the 
grip of Ankara’s powers. Political data accounted for refers to vote shares and not to the 
number of Members of Parliament effectively elected in each province. In the light of the 
d’Hondt electoral formula adopted in the country, the two do not exactly coincide. The choice 
to focus on party votes rather than on the number of politicians is motivated by the fact that, 
traditionally, the political system in Turkey has been dominated by political parties 
(Danielson and Keleṣ, 1985; Turan et al., 2005; Heper and Keyman, 2006).  
Kurdish nationalism: due to data shortages in the dispersion of ethnic Kurds, as well as 
other variables able to capture the Turkish/Kurdish cleavage, we proxy it through the % of 
votes received by pro-Kurdish parties.
6
 While the literature based on European countries 
suggests that regions with strong left or separatist parties are likely to receive more resources 
(Kemmerling and Stephan, 2008), our expectation in the Kurdish case will be opposite 
(Danielson and Keleṣ, 1985). Constant armed tensions in Kurd-inhabited areas and armed 
conflict may have limited public investment (Yeğen, 1999). 
Malapportionment: this variable consists in the ratio between the total provincial 
population (as a proxy for the total number of voters) and the number of seats allocated in 
                                                 
6
 Under the allegation of supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the main Kurdish parties have 
been repeatedly banned over the years. We therefore consider, at each election, the party in place at that moment. 
Since running as independent candidates and then agglomerating into a single group after elections has been a 
strategy to circumvent the seat allocation minimum national thresholds, we jointly consider Kurdish and 
independent votes.  
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each constituency. It is an indicator of electoral productivity, measuring the profitability for 
politicians of ‘investing’ in a constituency, depending on how many votes are needed to win a 
seat.   
4.2. Sample and data 
The analysis employs a panel data set covering 81 Turkish provinces over the period 2004-
2012. Basic data on national public investments per province was derived from the Ministry 
of Development (former State Planning Organisation).  
Electoral data for the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections was gathered from the European 
Election Database, as well as from Turkey’s Electoral High Committee. We annualised 
political variables by extending electoral results over each legislature. Electoral wards within 
metropolitan provinces are not taken into account and therefore national elections’ data are 
collected for provinces, which constitute the power bases of political parties and one of the 
most important units of political representation (Güvenç and Kırmanoğlu, 2009).  
Population information was obtained interpolating/extrapolating Turkstat’s 2001 general 
census and Turkstat regional database’s 2007-2011 figures. Data on the Provincial 
Development Index stems from interpolating the values from State Planning Organisation 
(1996, 2003) and Baday-Yıldız et al. (2010). Other socioeconomic data where obtained from 
Turkstat’s regional database and interpolated in case of missing years.  
A review of data sources as well as summary statistics for each variable are provided in 
Appendices 1 and 2. 
4.3. Identification strategies 
Our research hypotheses aim to test to what extent, and through which channels, political 
factors can be treated as determinants of the allocation of investments. Our strategy to explore 
such questions requires the use of two different estimators, both of which exploit the panel 
data variation between the three different electoral contests. We first adopt a fixed-effects 
(FE) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust estimator with province an annual time 
effects. Such estimator has the advantage of controlling for all the possible omitted variables 
that are idiosyncratic to provinces. To control for potential serial and spatial correlation, we 
estimate robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level (81 clusters). 
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Considering that plans for time t are prepared in advance and then approved by fall/winter of 
time t-1, we include a 1-year lag between right and left-side variables, which will also help 
minimise the endogeneity between dependent and explanatory variables.  
Although grounded in an ample body of works, our first estimation strategy may suffer 
from potential endogeneity caused by reverse causality, since higher/lower investments by the 
central government at election t may increase/decrease the votes given to the governing party 
at subsequent polls (Larcinese et al., 2012). 2002 electoral results can be considered 
exogenous due to the deep exogenous shock occurred in the political scene during that year. 
2007 and 2011 electoral results, however, risk suffering from endogeneity. To control for the 
robustness of FE results, our solution is to transform equation (2) using first difference 
Δ Yi,t = Δ β1Xi,t-1 + Δ β2Pi,t-1 + αi + nt + ɛi,t                                                                        (3) 
and then use Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)’s GMM robust 
system estimator, which instruments differences – equation (3) – with past levels, and levels – 
equation (2) – with past differences. The adoption of GMM-system rather than GMM-
difference (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is motivated by the latter’s severe constraints in 
presence of time series persistence, since lagged variable levels are extremely weak 
instruments for subsequent first-differences (Bond et al. 2001). The issue of low within-unit 
variance is particularly relevant in the case of political, electoral and institutional factors, 
which are by nature rather persistent over time (Plumper and Troeger, 2007).
7
 Robust, cluster 
and small options are adopted to obtain heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard 
errors as well as small-sample corrections to the covariance matrix estimate (Roodman, 
2009b).  
While system-GMM is an attractive technique to handle regressors’ potential endogeneity, 
internal instrumenting is also known for suffering from a series of limitations, including the 
risks of accepting results that are invalid because of weak instruments (Roodman, 2009a). In 
                                                 
7
 We also considered the use of a Fixed-Effect Vector Decomposition estimator (Plumper and Troeger, 
2007), eventually discarded for the inconsistency risks underlined by Breusch et al. (2011). 
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order to minimise such risks, the analysis restricts the range of lags to 2 and 5,
8
 while also 
collapsing the instrument matrix as proposed by Roodman (2009b).  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline results 
Table 1 presents the results obtained with the linear FE estimator. The first column shows 
the estimates corresponding to hypothesis H.1 and the alternative hypothesis H.1A (which 
refers to the same variables, but foresees opposed signs). The second and third columns 
present the results for the second hypothesis H.2, showing first the political coefficients alone 
and then the full political-economic model. The full model results are our preferred ones.  
                                                 
8
 As a further check, we have also tried different instrument solutions, such as adopting lags 2 to 6, lags to 2 
to 4 or only lags 2 and 3. In spite of such changes, both estimates and significance levels were overall constant. 
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Table 1. FE estimation of the empirical model.  
 (H.1) Equity/efficiency (H.2) Politics (H.2) Full model 
    
Contextual development level 0.403***  0.333*** 
 (0.130)  (0.114) 
Wealth -1.21e-05  -0.000182 
 (0.000547)  (0.000567) 
Manufacturing employment 0.00600  0.00694 
 (0.0127)  (0.0128) 
Education attainments -0.00776***  -0.00717*** 
 (0.000693)  (0.000693) 
Health conditions -0.00297  -0.00405 
 (0.00810)  (0.00748) 
Rural population 0.0816***  0.0736*** 
 (0.0255)  (0.0237) 
Governing party’s strongholds  0.0198*** 0.0127** 
  (0.00761) (0.00622) 
Main opposition party’s strongholds  -0.0163** -0.0176** 
  (0.00785) (0.00753) 
Third party’s strongholds  0.01159 0.0137 
  (0.13652) (0.0132) 
Kurdish nationalism  0.0147* 0.00962 
  (0.00901) (0.00890) 
Malapportionment  -0.4441 -1.40e-06 
  (0.28972) (2.70e-06) 
Observations 648 648 648 
R-squared (within) 0.165 0,151 0.177 
Number of regions 81 81 81 
Province FE yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
F-test 19.47 10.69 17.56 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses.. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Starting from the first research hypothesis, which argues that investments are used as a tool 
to address development needs, the results show contrasting evidence. Only three out of six 
indicators adopted to control for socioeconomic disadvantage are statistically significant, 
namely the composite indicator of contextual development, as well as the education 
attainments, and the rate of rural population. By contrast, the level of wealth and health 
conditions, although with the expected sign, are not statistically significant. Even within the 
three significant variables, the estimates seem to suggest that two contrasting trends are 
occurring. While the ratio of rural population is positively correlated to investments and the 
level of education negatively – thus confirming the progressive role of the development 
policy – the provincial development index (PDI) is strongly and positively, rather than 
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negatively, correlated to the amount of funding received by regions. Holding other variables 
constant, a one point increase in the index is correlated to an increase (column 1) of nearly 
40% of per-capita investments. Such fact, in particular, seems to support those who suggest 
that investments are indeed allocated according to socioeconomic criteria but, rather than with 
the aim of reducing regional disparities, with the objective of concentrating resources in 
already developed areas. In this respect, the results support our alternative hypothesis (H1.A), 
as was the case of earlier works by Danielson and Keleṣ (1985) and Gezici and Hewings 
(2004). An important difference from such earlier studies however exists: on the one hand, the 
progressive character of investments is blurred into a strategy based on privileging areas with 
a minimum level of development. On the other hand, however, the Ministry of Development 
also seems to be channelling investments towards area with higher levels of socioeconomic 
structural disadvantage, i.e. characterised by a lower level of education and a higher degree of 
rural population. A one point increase in the percentage of rural population, for example, is 
correlated to an increase (column 1) of nearly 8% in per-capita investments. An explanation 
of this apparent contradiction may lie in the role that Anatolian, middle cities have played in 
recent development trends and, therefore, may suggest that the government has favoured the 
better off among the most in need. Such result is coherent with the ‘growth centres’ strategy 
put in place in recent years (particularly in the 9
th
 National Development Plan covering the 
period 2007-2013), according to which specific growth poles have to be selected for the 
concentration of public investments in underdeveloped areas.   
The coefficients for political factors are shown in column 2, while column 3 displays the 
full model. Coefficients for the governing party and the main opposition one are both 
statistically significant and with the expected signs, both when included alone and when 
socio-economic regressors are controlled for. Holding other variables constant, the national 
AKP government seems to favour its party strongholds in the allocation of investments. This 
confirms that in a closed-list PR system, the AKP has tried to cement its links with its main 
constituencies. The opposite is true for votes for the main opposition party, whose coefficient 
is negative and significant, suggesting that the central government also uses public 
investments to ‘punish’ areas voting for the opposition.  
The coefficient of the third party – the MHP – is not significant, suggesting that the main 
redistributive politics are played around the two main parties. Such result may be in line with 
the fact that the third party has achieved a high level of electoral support in only a few 
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provinces. The coefficient for the pro-Kurdish votes is positive and statistically significant in 
the second model. This result contradicts earlier research, which suggested that, during the 
1980s and 1990s, mostly Kurdish-inhabited areas were significantly disadvantaged in public 
investment. Yet, once socio-economic controls are included (third model), the coefficient 
becomes insignificant. Finally, the results for malapportionment have the expected sign, but 
are not statistically significant.  
In the first pages of the article we hypothesised that the potential ineffectiveness of 
regional development policies carried out in Turkey may be related not only to the use of 
wrong tools to target regional disparities, but also to the fact that those tools do not properly 
address the developmental targets because of politically distorted allocations. The overall 
results suggest a more nuanced conclusion. Appendix 4 shows the same main estimates of 
Table 1 but taking into account standardised values. Standardise coefficients ease the 
comparison across variables. First of all, socioeconomic measures remain the most relevant 
predictors of investment, with standardised coefficients of 0.982 and 0.330 for rurality and 
socioeconomic development respectively. By contrast, the politically most relevant variables 
show much lower coefficients, namely 0.197 (governing party’s strongholds) and -0.154 
(main opposition party). This means that, while political considerations are important in the 
allocation of public investments in Turkey, they generally play second fiddle to 
socioeconomic factors, which remain the main drivers of public expenditure. 
5.2. Robustness checks 
Testing for the robustness of the FE estimator’s results to possible endogeneity issues, 
GMM-system outputs are provided in Table 2. The specification tests on the validity of 
instruments are included in the lower section of the Table. As required, the AR serial 
correlation tests show that only first-order but not second-order serial correlation is detected. 
The Hansen J-test also confirms the appropriateness of the instruments, whose count does not 
overfit the models.  
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Table 2.  GMM-SYS estimation of the empirical model. 
 (H.1) Equity/efficiency (H.2) Politics (H.2) Full model 
Contextual development level 0.607***  0.373** 
 (0.210)  (0.171) 
Wealth -0.000827*  0.000363 
 (0.000417)  (0.000452) 
Manufacturing employment 0.0241  0.0247* 
 (0.0180)  (0.0140) 
Education attainments 0.00325  0.00396* 
 (0.00212)  (0.00233) 
Health conditions 0.0230*  0.00575 
 (0.0121)  (0.0111) 
Rural population 0.0531***  0.0379*** 
 (0.0179)  (0.0122) 
Governing party’s strongholds  0.0013 0.0239** 
  (0.00756) (0.00933) 
Main opposition party’s strongholds  -0.00365 -0.0194** 
  (0.00853) (0.00851) 
Third party’s strongholds  -0.0286*** -0.0119 
  (0.01093) (0.0127) 
Kurdish nationalism  -0.0078 0.0175* 
  (0.00576) (0.00994) 
Malapportionment  -0.8236 -7.61e-06** 
  (0.000) (3.72e-06) 
Constant 3.290*** 15.669*** 3.372** 
 (1.054) (1.979) (1.516) 
Observations 648 648 648 
Number of id 81 81 81 
Year FE yes yes yes 
F-test 15.81 11.56 14.13 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (1) -5.27 -5.40 -5.20 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (2) -0.16 -0.00 0.08 
 (0.871) (0.997) (0.936) 
N. of instruments 38 45 58 
Hansen 28.95 37.35 40.38 
 (0.222) (0.200) (0.409) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
The results are broadly consistent with those of Table 1. Among the socioeconomic 
variables, the level of development and the ratio of rural population maintain the same signs 
and overall significance levels of the FE estimator. Manufacturing employment, from being 
insignificant across the FE results, now becomes significant in the second model. In addition, 
the level of economic wealth (the number of private cars per 10.000 inhabitants) now appears 
with the expected, negative sign and is statistically significant in the first model (but not when 
political factors are accounted for).  
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Interestingly the key political variables of hypothesis H.2 (governing and main opposition 
parties), when analysed without controlling for developmental divides (i.e. taken alone, in 
column 2), retain the expected sign, but are insignificant. Yet, once controlled for both 
socioeconomic and political factors (column 3), the GMM-system estimator provides overall 
results similar to those of Table 1. The coefficient for the governing and the main opposition 
parties regain statistical significance, while also witnessing an increase in the intensity of their 
coefficients. The coefficient for the third party continues to be insignificant, while Kurdish 
nationalism becomes significant.  
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Table 3. FE and GMM-SYS estimation of the extended model measuring political clout 
through each party’s number of Parliament seats instead of parties’ vote shares, 2004-2012.  
 Full model - FE Full model GMM 
   
Contextual development level 0.468*** 0.501*** 
 (0.135) (0.161) 
Wealth -0.000453 -0.000563* 
 (0.000587) (0.000288) 
Manufacturing employment -0.00424 -0.00958 
 (0.0124) (0.0144) 
Education attainments -0.00808*** 0.00419* 
 (0.000653) (0.00221) 
Health conditions -0.00605 0.0127 
 (0.00823) (0.0101) 
Rural population 0.0606** 0.0197 
 (0.0288) (0.0147) 
Gov. party: MPs -0.0277 0.0169 
 (0.0454) (0.0461) 
Main opp. Party: MPs -0.0822* 0.00520 
 (0.0446) (0.0510) 
Third party: MPs  -0.222*** -0.141*** 
 (0.0572) (0.0415) 
Kurdish nationalism: MPs -0.0525 0.150** 
 (0.0863) (0.0711) 
Malapportionment -2.72e-06 -9.36e-06*** 
 (2.91e-06) (2.23e-06) 
Constant 3.636*** 6.930*** 
 (1.378) (0.871) 
Observations 648 648 
R-squared (within) 0.198 // 
Number of regions 81 81 
Province FE yes // 
Year FE yes yes 
F-test 28.37 24.73 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
AR (1)  -5.39 
  (0.000) 
AR (2)  0.05 
  (0.957) 
N. of instruments  56 
Hansen  43.05 
  (0.195) 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
A second robustness check concerns the variable accounted for to measure political clout, 
as discussed in section 4.1. While in a pure proportional electoral system the two measures 
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coincide, in the Turkish electoral system they do not.
9
 Table 3 reports the results of the 
extended models where, instead of the % vote casts obtained by each party, political clout is 
measured by the number of MPs elected in each province by each party. Now, the coefficients 
for the main and opposition parties are not significant, while for the Kurdish party are unclear, 
being first negative and insignificant, then positive and significant. Overall, the results seem 
to confirm the hypothesis put forward by McGillivray (2004) on the predominance – in a 
closed-list PR system, such as Turkey – of parties over individual legislators: political 
coefficients still show the expected signs, but their overall statistical significance is reduced. 
The exception is related to the third party whose MPs seem to be significantly driving down 
investments. Considering the very limited number of provinces where third parties receive a 
majoritarian support, we however suggest treating these results with care, as this coefficient is 
likely to be driven by some outliers. 
Further checks to control that results are not driven by outlier cities such as Istanbul were 
also carried. Regressions were both run excluding Istanbul and then also Ankara and Izmir. 
Although not presented here, such checks confirm the validity of the main results: coefficients 
maintain the same signs and statistical significance, while the overall fit of the models 
increases slightly.  
Finally, we run some placebo regressions where the one-year lag between dependent and 
explanatory variables is excluded. If our theoretical framework is correct, the electoral results 
should only influence future allocations – and not current ones – because of the time needed 
to translate strategic political decisions into allocation plans.  Appendix 5 shows that, while 
socio-economic variables retain very similar coefficients and statistical significance – 
suggesting that socio-economic variables change slowly over time – political ones now turn 
insignificant altogether.   
5.3. Discussion of results 
According to the ample body of literature on the links between economic development and 
the quality of institutions, and on the pervasiveness of patronage, we would have expected 
                                                 
9
 The coefficients of pairwise correlation (at national level, and at 5% significance level) between the % of 
vote casts and the share of MPs obtained by each party in the provinces over our period of study are respectively: 
AKP, 0.59; CHP, 0.73, MHP, 0.67; Kurdish party, 0.73. 
 - 30 - 
that in Turkey the geographical allocation of public monies would have been prevalently 
determined by political machinations (Gönenç et al., 2005). Our results, however, show a 
much more nuanced picture: in spite of their relevance as a driver of investments, political 
factors are less important than socioeconomic ones. So, how can these two contrasting 
conclusions be reconciled?  
The first, most straightforward explanation is that such results are a proof of the ‘relative 
strength’ of the Turkish State. Indeed, compared to other emerging countries, it is possible to 
argue that Turkey’s bureaucracy is capable of implementing independent policies. Such 
discourse may be particularly relevant for planning which, since the creation of the State 
Planning Organisation (currently Ministry for Development), has been staffed by a trained 
and competent state bureaucratic elite.  
Second, what this research design – as well as many similar works from the literature on 
distributive politics – is mostly able to capture is pork-barrelling. However, as Golden (2003) 
and Persson and Tabellini (2000) suggest, pork-barrels and patronage are not the same. While 
standard pork-barrels and constituency services involve the allocation of a collective good 
such as building a road, a school, or a factory that, in any case, will be likely to encompass a 
collective benefit, patronage can be interpreted as the individualization and personalization of 
pork-barrels: “in a patronage system, pork-barrel allocations, which although targeted at 
specific electoral constituencies nonetheless involve public goods, are transformed into 
private goods, aimed at specific, named clienteles” (Golden, 2003, p. 200). Recognising such 
distinction, it is possible to argue that what is really more likely to increase with political 
corruption and poor institutional quality are not pork-barrels, but the forms of patronage 
networks, which, for their nature, are difficult to be captured by macro-level statistical 
analyses conducted on electoral districts.  
Third, political economic studies conducted at electoral levels – such as this article – are 
naturally badly equipped with tools to offer answers to the question of who, within a given 
district, is able to extract rents out of public projects and goods, even when these are allocated 
to areas most in need of them. Consequently, personalised political manipulations and 
corruption may happen not in the allocation of investments across provinces but at much 
smaller scale, such as in the local management of resources. This is what Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2000) call ‘local political capture’. The cases of local economic development 
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initiatives studied by Özcan (2006) in the new industrial Anatolian town of Kayseri show that 
the politicisation of development initiatives happens not only among regions, but also within 
the same locality – a process difficult to be captured unless adopting a qualitative, in-depth 
approach.  
In spite of the prevalence of ‘technical’ criteria, our results also confirm the fact that 
electoral concerns in Turkey are relevant predictors of allocations. The analysis clearly 
uncovers a neat political cleavage occurring between the governing and the main opposition 
party. In light of the political protests that sprung in Turkey since summer 2013, such 
outcomes provide a picture of Turkey as a country with a neat socio-political fracture between 
pro-government supporters – i.e. provinces voting for the incumbent party – and anti-
government supporters.  
To conclude, the results of our analysis also question any antithetical interpretation of the 
political economy of public policy-making. Public choice literature has largely emphasised 
the role of political concerns behind the design of public policies and the standard economic 
literature has focused much more on concepts of efficiency. As our outcomes suggest, the real 
world picture is a more complex one, where ‘purely electoral political’ goals and objective 
socioeconomic criteria can be interlinked rather than diametrically opposed. 
 
6. Conclusions  
This article has examined whether public investment in Turkey follows socioeconomic – 
that is, the policy principles officially set out by the State – or political criteria. In line with 
much of the literature on distributive politics, our results show that politics plays an important 
role in influencing public investment allocations. The governing AKP has not been immune to 
the temptation of showering regions that voted for it with additional investments. 
Nonetheless, the magnitude of pork-barrel is relatively low in comparison to the role played 
by socioeconomic factors. Indeed, after controlling for electoral politics variables, 
socioeconomic measures remain the most relevant predictors of public investment.  
Our results therefore challenge much of the public choice literature, which seems to 
overemphasise the impacts of electoral politics on policy-making. In spite of the earlier 
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evidence showing high levels of informal, patronal consensus building practices (Özcan, 
2000, Heper and Keyman, 2006) and idiosyncratically controlled group loyalties (Özcan, 
2006) occurring in Turkey, our analysis suggests that the Turkish state is also able to carry out 
policies driven by technical criteria.  
The results point – somewhat unexpectedly for a country which has placed great emphasis 
in addressing territorial disparities – to a state which tends to favour areas with a higher level 
of development over the ones with the most critical ‘socioeconomic need’. This aim clashes 
with the developmental policy principles set out in the Constitution and in the main planning 
document about reducing regional imbalances.  
Similarly, our results also cast doubts on earlier findings for Turkey, which depict the 
country as a highly kleptocratic from a policy perspective (Danielson and Keleṣ, 1985; Heper 
and Keyman, 2006).   
Such apparently contrasting findings may be explained in two ways: on the one hand, our 
results may suggest that Turkey’s strong state tradition has stopped electoral politics from 
completely dominating over technical policy criteria. Compared to other emerging countries, 
Turkey possesses a very long tradition of bureaucratic elite ‘who acted in the name of the 
state by assuming virtually complete autonomy from other groups in the polity, including the 
political elite’ (Heper and Keyman, 2006, p. 259). Our results may thus confirm the strength 
of the country’s very centralised and bureaucratic state apparatus, as well as its deep 
commitment to a modernisation paradigm prone to ‘grand/programmatic interventions’. On 
the other hand, what is more likely to increase with the decrease of institutional quality – as 
indicators for Turkey would suggest (Gönenç et al., 2005) – are not pork-barrels but the forms 
of clientelism and patronage networks, which may happen at much smaller scale – a topic 
which opens up further room for research, based on the use of quantitative as well as 
qualitative analysis.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Variables: review of main hypotheses and their operationalization  
          Variable Variable description  Source 
H.1 Socioeconomic 
rationales 
 Ministry of Development (former 
State Planning Organisation) 
 Contextual 
development level 
Provincial Development Index Devlet Planma Teskilati (1996, 
2003a), Baday-Yildiz, Sivri and 
Berber (2010) 
 Wealth Private cars per 10.000 inhabitants Turkstat Regional Database 
 Manufacturing 
employment 
% employment in manufacturing Turkstat Regional Database 
 Rural population % of rural population Turkstat Regional Database 
 Education 
attainments 
% high education students Turkstat Regional Database 
 Health conditions ‰ hospital beds Turkstat Regional Database 
H.2 Politics: parties   
 Governing party’s 
strongholds 
% of votes for AKP Turkey’s electoral High Committee, 
European Election Database Number of AKP MPs   
 Main opposition 
party’s strongholds 
% votes for CHP Turkey’s electoral High Committee, 
European Election Database Number of CHP MPs   
 Third opposition 
party’s strongholds 
% votes for MHP Turkey’s electoral High Committee, 
European Election Database Number of MHP MPs   
 Kurdish 
nationalism 
% votes to Kurdish nationalist parties Turkey’s electoral High Committee, 
European Election Database Number of MPs related to Kurdish 
nationalism   
  Malapportionment Ratio between the province’s total population 
and the number of parliamentary seats 
allocated to it. 
Turkstat Regional Database 
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Appendix 2. Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Log Investments 5.191 0.744 1.728 9.542 
PDI -0.001 0.986 -1.659 4.150 
Private cars 680.137 372.452 71.542 2017.398 
Manufacturing 20.648 9.553 3.8 46.3 
Education 4.369 19.046 0.036 254.955 
Hospital beds 23.287 9.054 4.145 52.045 
Rural population 38.263 13.598 1.010 70.855 
Governing party – AKP 42.870 15.216 6.500 84.820 
Main opposition party – CHP 17.331 9.016 2.010 52.500 
Third party – MHP 12.191 6.900 0 44.9 
Kurdish nationalism 9.522 16.158 0 70.8 
Malapportionment 110778 27796 32206 189366 
Gov. party – AKP: MPs 4.262 5.049 0 46 
Main opp. Party – CHP: MPs 1.717 3.402 0 29 
Third party – MHP: MPs 0.535 1.059 0 7 
Kurdish nationalism: MPs 0.276 0.724 0 5 
Ministry from the province 0.274 0.446 0 1 
Source: own elaboration 
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Appendix 3.  Pairwise correlations among variables 
Electoral variables by parties’ votes shares 
 lpcinem ipdi carpop empma hiedpop bedpop rurpop akp chp mhp totkurd malapportionment 
lpcinem 1.000            
ipdi 0.0542 1.000           
carpop 0.1322* 0.7700* 1.000          
empma 0.0243 0.6092* 0.4445* 1.000         
hiedpop 0.1323* 0.1522* 0.2022* 0.2622* 1.000        
bedpop 0.2333* 0.3099* 0.4759* 0.0519 0.2581* 1.000       
rurpop -0.1195* -0.6534* -0.4799* -0.5552* -0.2185* -0.2495* 1.000      
akp 0.2176* -0.0547 0.1216* 0.0261 0.0127 0.2510* -0.1248* 1.000     
chp 0.0363 0.5117* 0.5568* 0.2989* 0.1225* 0.1977* -0.1768* -0.2853* 1.000    
mhp 0.0988* 0.2404* 0.4467* 0.0767 0.0541 0.1754* -0.1123* 0.1018* 0.2334* 1.000   
totkurd -0.0566 -0.4978* -0.6238* -0.3187* -0.0966* -0.4497* 0.1583* -0.4140* -0.3835* -0.4920* 1.000  
malapportionment -0.1398* 0.4567* 0.3766* 0.4025* 0.0466 -0.0187 -0.4836* -0.0185 0.2496* -0.1144* -0.0425 1.000 
Source: own elaboration 
Electoral variables by parties’ Members of Parliament 
 lpcinem ipdi carpop empma hiedpop bedpop rurpop akp_mp chp_mp mhp_mp kurd_mp  malapportionment 
lpcinem 1.000            
ipdi 0.0542 1.000           
carpop 0.1322* 0.7700* 1.000          
empma 0.0243 0.6092* 0.4445* 1.000         
hiedpop 0.1323* 0.1522* 0.2022* 0.2622* 1.000        
bedpop 0.2333* 0.3099* 0.4759* 0.0519 0.2581* 1.000       
rurpop -0.1195* -0.6534* -0.4799* -0.5552* -0.2185* -0.2495* 1.000      
akp_mp 0.0027 0.5818* 0.3341* 0.2903* -0.0273 0.0938* -0.4982* 1.000     
chp_mp -0.0108 0.7116* 0.4440* 0.3305* 0.0131 0.0683 -0.4807* 0.8293* 1.000    
mhp_mp 0.0136 0.4959* 0.4573* 0.2318* 0.0337 0.1317* -0.4347* 0.5040* 0.4855* 1.000   
kurd_mp 0.0463 -0.2765* -0.3563* -0.1239* -0.0627 -0.2408* 0.0015 0.1145* 0.0161 0.0155 1.000  
malapportionment -0.1398* 0.4567* 0.3766* 0.4025* 0.0466 -0.0187 -0.4836* 0.5180* 0.4849* 0.4151* 0.1239*  1.000 
Source: own elaboration 
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Appendix 4. FE estimation of the empirical model adopting standardised coefficients..  
VARIABLES (H.1) Equity/efficiency  (H.2) Politics 
    
Contextual development level 0.488***  0.330*** 
 (0.157)  (0.113) 
Wealth -0.00524  -0.0644 
 (0.237)  (0.200) 
Manuf. Employment 0.0702  0.0663 
 (0.148)  (0.122) 
Education -0.157***  -0.118*** 
 (0.0140)  (0.0114) 
Health conditions -0.0342  -0.0380 
 (0.0930)  (0.0703) 
Rural population 1.333***  0.982*** 
 (0.416)  (0.317) 
Governing party’s strongholds  0.308** 0.197** 
  (0.117) (0.0965) 
Main opposition party’s strongholds  -0.143** -0.154** 
  (0.0679) (0.0656) 
Third party’s strongholds  0.0748 0.0906 
  (0.0886) (0.0870) 
Kurdish nationalism  0.239 0.156 
  (0.147) (0.145) 
Malapportionment  -0.116 -0.0383 
  (0.0801) (0.0739) 
Constant 0.0324 5.179*** 5.062*** 
 (0.0827) (0.0955) (0.0809) 
Observations 648 648 648 
R-squared 0.165 0.150 0.177 
Number of regions 81 81 81 
Prov FE yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are lagged by one year. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5. FE placebo estimation of the empirical model  
VARIABLES (H.1) Equity/efficiency  (H.2) Politics 
    
Contextual development level 0.336**  0.293** 
 (0.134)  (0.134) 
Wealth 8.42e-06  -8.13e-05 
 (0.000611)  (0.000621) 
Manuf. Employment 0.0343**  0.0346** 
 (0.0133)  (0.0137) 
Education -0.00599***  -0.00586*** 
 (0.000688)  (0.000766) 
Health conditions 0.00167  0.00290 
 (0.00835)  (0.00824) 
Rural population 0.0861**  0.0861** 
 (0.0377)  (0.0375) 
Governing party’s strongholds  0.0113 0.00566 
  (0.00683) (0.00627) 
Main opposition party’s strongholds  -0.000675 -0.00333 
  (0.00736) (0.00702) 
Third party’s strongholds  0.00754 0.0138 
  (0.0123) (0.0114) 
Kurdish nationalism  0.0108 0.00668 
  (0.00697) (0.00690) 
Malapportionment  -0.313 -0.0377 
  (0.260) (0.262) 
Constant 0.0324 8.113*** 0.992 
 (0.0827) (3.072) (3.883) 
Observations 567 567 567 
R-squared 0.139 0.102 0.141 
Number of regions 81 81 81 
Prov FE yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes 
Notes: The dependent variable is expressed in logarithms. All explanatory variables are now not lagged by 
one year.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
